Lexicon of Arguments

 

Gadamer I 251
Intentionality/Husserl/Gadamer: That fact that Husserl has that of transcendental subjectivity everywhere in mind simply corresponds to the task of phenomenological constitutional research. But it is characteristic of his actual intention that he does not say consciousness, not even subjectivity, but "life".
He wants to go back behind the actuality of the consciousness that means, yes, also behind the potentiality of the fellow human being to the universality of a last that alone is able to measure the universality of what has been accomplished, i.e. what is constituted in its validity. It is a fundamentally anonymous intentionality, i.e. an intentionality that is no longer made by name, by which the all-encompassing world horizon is constituted. >Horizon/Husserl, >Time-Consciousness/Husserl, >Lifeworld/Husserl.

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Graeser I 16
Husserl/Graeser: intentionality for Husserl is a phenomenon sui generis which applies to all mental phenomena. (That was new at that time.)
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Husserl I 57
Intentionality/Husserl: constitution is the performance character of consciousness.
I 31
Meaningful Intention/Husserl: meaningful act: I refer to an object by means of a meaning, the general structure of intentional consciousness.
I 41
Intentionality/Existence/Husserl: the talk of existence as well as of the non-existence of intentional objects has no meaning. For example, the idea of the God Jupiter does not change structurally if this object exists or does not exist.