Lexicon of Arguments

 Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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Glüer II 65 ff
Davidson: proper causal chains are necessary for intentionality.
Glüer II 110
Davidson: proper causal chains are necessary for intentionality. >Causal chains, >causal theory of reference.
Glüer II 135 ff
The intentionalistic predicates are essentially normative.
- - -
Davidson I (b) 26
Intentional States/Davidson: for Davidson there is an analogy to >measurement: intentional states are assumed, but not as entities (weight is not an entity for itself, but a property of the object) - intentions do not have to live in the brain as weights do not live in the object. They do not need to play a physiological role, just as numbers play no physical role. Therefore: if the subject does not find any entities here, it does not follow that it does not know what it thinks.

>Intentions, >Actions, >Explanations, >Meaning, >Language.

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