Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 226
Meaning/reference/Frege/Geach: Frege's distinction is not the same as between intension/extension.
>Extension, >Reference, >Meaning, >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning.
I 227
Term/Concepts/Frege: Frege has a purely extensional view. - Therefore there is no "sense of the name" but reference of the predicate.
>Extensionality, >Predicate/Frege, >Sense, >Object/Frege, >Concept/Frege.
((s) Reference/(s): set of the mentioned items, = Extension).
But:
Extension/Frege: = object
Concept/Frege: no object.
The reason for this is: a term is unsaturated, an object saturated. "Red" does not stand a term - otherwise the term would be a name.
((s) The concepts "intension" and "extension" were coined later by Carnap.)