Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

Concept/Author*  

What is wrong?
Page
Other metadata
Translation
Excerpt or content
Other

Correction: Year / Place / Page
/ /

Correction:
(max 500 charact.)

Your username*
or User-ID

Email address*

The complaint
will not be published.

 
VII 146
Extension/Carnap: E.g. class of all blue objects - E.g. intension of "blue" in English: the quality of being blue - intension, not extension makes us understand statements.
VII 149
Intension/Carnap: the analysis of the intension for a natural language is just as reliable as that of the extension!
QuineVs: pragmatic intension terms are unclear and mysterious.
VII 150
Quine: that is in principle, it is not only about the generally accepted technical difficulty of the determination.
Carnap: Question: Assuming that the linguist can determine the extension, how can he also determine the intension?
In any case, this is a completely new step:
For example, suppose that two field linguists have reached complete agreement on the extensions of the natives.
Now it is still possible to attribute different intensions to the predicates thus fixed extensionally!
Because there is more than one and possibly infinitely many different properties, whose extension in the given area is just the extension for which the predicate in question has been determined!
Example (s) If all considered dogs are brown, it is not clear whether the color or the dogs were picked out.
Carnap: In addition, quadruped could be meant if the descriptive word is unknown. The whole extension would also be covered.

VII 151
Intensionalist thesis of pragmatism/CarnapVsQuine: the determination of intension is an empirical hypothesis that can be tested by observing language habits.

Extensionalist thesis / QuineVsCarnap: the determination of intension is ultimately a question of taste, the linguist is free because it cannot be tested. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise either.
Quine: the completed encyclopedia is ex pede Herculem, i.e. we risk an error if we start at the end of the foot. But we can take advantage of it!
If, on the other hand, we delay a definition of synonymity in the case of the lexicon, no problem arises, nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false.

Intensionalist These/Carnap: pro: Example translation manual: the linguist begins:

(1) horse, horse

another linguist enters:

(2) Horse, horse or unicorn

since there is no unicorn, the two intentions have the same extension! ((s) Disjunction: for the extension two intentions can be assumed, if one is empty, like unicorn).
Extensionalistic thesis/Quine: if it is correct, there is no way to make an empirical decision between (1) and (2).
VII 152
Solution/CarnapVsQuine: the linguist not only has to calculate the real cases, but also the possible ones.
((s) David Lewis: applies modality not to objects, but to intensions, e.g. facts or characteristics!).
Ambiguity/Intensions/Carnap: Ambiguity can be overcome by providing suitable explanations and examples. For me there are no objections against modality.
But it is also not necessary:
For example, the linguist could simply describe cases to the native that he knows are possible and leave open whether there is something that fulfills the descriptions. (So e.g. describe a unicorn, or point to a corresponding picture, etc.).
The affirmative or negative answer will form an affirmative case for (1) or (2).
This shows that (1) and (2) are different empirical hypotheses.
Intension/Carnap: all logically possible cases of determination come into consideration. Also causally impossible! >Unicorn example, >Non-existence.

VII 158
Intension/Carnap: scope of a predicate, truth conditions. So that the speaker can attribute the predicate
Def analytical: if the intension includes all possible cases for the speaker
Def synonymous: two expressions with the same intension for a speaker
Def language/Carnap: system of related dispositions.
- - -
Newen I 120
Def Intension/Carnap: = truth conditions - Def Extension/Carnap: = truth value.
>Truth conditions, >Truth values.

Found an error? Use our Complaint Form. Perhaps someone forgot to close a bracket? A page number is wrong?
Help us to improve our lexicon.
However, if you are of a different opinion, as regards the validity of the argument, post your own argument beside the contested one.
The correction will be sent to the contributor of the original entry to get his opinion about.