Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Theses I
Theses II

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Glüer II 69
E.g. identity: How clear is the idea of the ancient Greeks. - Some ancient Greeks believed the earth was flat? This earth? If anyone believes nothing of what we believe about the earth, to what extent does it refer to the earth?
Glüer II 72
This makes it clear that beliefs must be thought of in a similarly networked way as sentences. Beliefs - like sentences - never occur individually.
- - -
Davidson I (b) 21
Identity/Quine: we cannot pick out "the" relationship which is constitutive for the recognition of the identity of an object - any property can be regarded as relevant - Davidson: if the mind always had to establish a clear relation to the object, thinking would be impossible.
- - -
Frank I 672
Identity/Davidson: "molecular identical", "tie identical": For example, the same skin redness can be a sunburn on one hand, and something quite different on the other. - Even twin earth twins are molecule-identical.
>Twin earth.
I 674
DavidsonVsPutnam: but they are not psychically identical.
>Anomalous monism.

Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58

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