Correction: (max 500 charact.)
The complaint will not be published.
I, 117 ff
Contingent Identity/some authors: here the Leibniz principle fails.
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Leibniz principle .
Cresswell: better: that is only apparent identity.
E.g. the largest wooden building = the most beautiful building
right: the largest wooden necessary wooden - but not necessary identical with the most beautiful.
Problem: If it is identical, then it is necessarily indentical.
Necessary identity/(s): according to Kripke identity is necessary when names rather than labels are involved.
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Identity/Kripke , >
Descriptions , >
Proper names .
I 126
Necessary identity/Cresswell: if morning star = evening star, then: (if morning star and evening star nominal):
false: N (morning star x)(evening star y) (x = y)
but true:
(morning star x)(evening star y)N(x = y).
For x = y is true in every world under an attribution V iff V(x) = V(y), and then it is true in every possible world if it is true in one and then N(x = y).
Cresswell later: this corresponds in Hughes/Cresswell/HC: "The man next door = the major" as a natural truth: that is unnatural.
Cf. >
Morning star/Evening star .
Hughes I 167f
Identity/Hughes/Cresswell: identity is always necessary: (x =) always underlying, even if x appears under different descriptions.
The descriptions are contingent, but not the identity of the object with itself - this also applies to non-identity: it is always necessary even if the corresponding sentence is true.
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Non-identity .