I 57
Identification/Strawson: if directly due to localization then without mentioning of other particulars - E.g. death depends on living things - e.g. but flash not from something flashing.
>
Dependence.
I 64
Identification/Strawson: observable particulars can also be identified without mentioning their causes or the things on which they depend, - conceptual dependency does not matter - but one cannot always identify births without identifying them as the birth of a living being.
I 65
Asymmetry: we do not need necessarily a term in language for births as particulars - but for living beings, because we are living beings ourselves.
>
Continuant, >
Person, >
Subject.
I 66
Identifiability/particular/Strawson: minimum condition: they must be neither private nor unobservable.
>
Particulars/Strawson, >
Language community, cf. >
Private language, >
Understanding, >
Communication.
I 87
Identificaion/Strawson: we cannot talk about private things when we cannot talk about public things.
I 153
Identification/StrawsonVsLeibniz: identification requires a demonstrative element: that contradicts Leibniz monads for which there should be descriptions alone in general term.
>
General terms.
Then, according to Leibniz, identification (individuation) is only possible for God: the "complete term" of an individual.
That is at the same time a description of the entire universe (from a certain point, which guarantees the uniqueness).
>
Complete concept.
I 245
Identification/Universal/names/particulars/Strawson: speaker/listener each must know a distinctive fact about Socrates.
But it must not be the same - E.g. "That man there can lead you".
Crucial: that someone stands there - N.B.: no part introduces a single thing, but the statement as a whole presents it.
>
Particulars/Strawson, >
Introduction/Strawson.
- - -
VII 124
Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel by swimming through it twice" - it has the (wrong!) appearances, that one "refers twice",
a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or
b) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same error as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression.
E.g. "Scott is Scott".
>
Waverley example.
---
Tugendhat I 400-403
Identification/Strawson:
a) pointing
b) description, spacetime points.
TugendhatVsStrawson: because he had accepted Russell's theory of direct relation unconsciously, he did not see that there are no two orders.
Tugendhat like Brandom: demonstrative identification presupposes the spatiotemporal, non-demonstrative - (deixis presupposes anaphora).
>
Deixis/Brandom.
Difference: specification/Tugendhat: "which of them all?"
Identification: only kind: by spacetime points.
