Glüer II 108
Actions/Davidson: Action depends on description (Example: Mary) - Events are independent of description. >
Events/Davidson. E.g. Mary shoots the burglar and kills her father.
Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation.
Glüer II 109 f
Davidson can argue precisely on the basis of the anomalism thesis (cf. >
anomalous monism) in favor of a monism 1: monism results from the combination of two other premises of the theory of action: (Causal Interaction) principle of causal interaction. At least some mental events interact causally with physical events. (Undeniable) (Nomological Character) principle of the nomological character of causality: events that are in cause-effect relation fall under strict laws.
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Brandom I 724
Action/Davidson: is an act if there is a description under which it is intentional - Brandom: there are two kinds of intentional explanation: a) what was intended - b) what was achieved
I 726
Success/Problem: Nicole successfully killed the animal in front of her (cow instead of stag) - is description dependent.
Brandom I 727
She believed of a cow (de re) that it was a stag - incorrect de dicto: she believed "the cow was a stag" (that the cow).
I 728
Reference: she had (without realizing it) the intention, in relation to the cow, to shoot it - it is about the content of the commitment, not about the type of commitment. - as in beliefs.
Brandom I 957
Accordion Effect/success/Davidson: Example: even though the powder was wet, she succeeded in bending her finger - so there is success in every action. - Example Mountain Climber.
I 958
Solution/Brandom: Reference to VURDs: there needs to be nothing that I intend and in which I succeeded.
I 729
Example: I reach for the bread and spill the wine.
I 957
Intention: is not wanting that a sentence becomes true (de dicto).
Intentions do not correspond to the specifications agreed on, but to the ones recognized - Davidson: muscle contraction does not need to be part of the intention - Brandom: but intentionally I can only contract my muscles in this way by reaching for the bread - the content of the intention can thus be specified as de re - thus success or failure can be established.
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Glüer II 92
Quine: ontology is only physical objects and classes - action is not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action event and reference object.
Glüer II 96
Action/Event/Adverbial Analysis/Davidson/Glüer: Problem: there are 2 types of adverbs resist:
1) Example "almost" hit: syncategorematic, not removable
2) Example "good", "large", "small" can possibly be omitted.
MontagueVsDavidson: Events are superfluous, "modifier theory" - KimVsDavidson: to not identify events with individuated individuals, but with properties - ((s) i.e. inversely)
Glüer II 110
Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation - ((s) Because the example of the differing causal chain superimposes an intention and makes it ineffective - Example Mountain Climbers.)
((s) Something does not yet become action, because it is intentional, proper causation must be added.)
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Intentions, >
Explanations, >
Meaning, >
Language.
