Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

Concept/Author*  

What is wrong?
Page
Other metadata
Translation
Excerpt or content
Other

Correction: Year / Place / Page
/ /

Correction:
(max 500 charact.)

Your username*
or User-ID

Email address*

The complaint
will not be published.

 
I 131
Emotion/Ryle: emotion is not the same as mood. A tingling sensation is tickling, feeling sick is not the same as being sick.
Mood/Ryle: mood is not recognizing, not understanding - but open, from the heart, not the head.
I 137
Emotion/Ryle: it is absurd not to know if you feel better but it is not absurd not to know whether one is healthier now.
I 137
Emotion is not linked with arousal or inclination. Sensations are not intentional.
>Sensation, >Intentionality, >Arousal/Psychology.
I 140
Fantasy (novel) brings real suffering and real tears but spurious indignation.
Delight, relief, sorrow: are signs of feelings, not the feelings themselves.
I 143 f
Emotions/sensations: emotions like itching, tingling, stinging, biting, prickling, drilling, nausea, shock, anxiety and tension are at most accidental explanations for actions.
Mood: is delight, joy, sorrow, longing, nostalgia, passion, excitement, disappointment (even in the absence) and also the mood to like to do something (disposition).
>Disposition.
Mood: is not an experience and not an object of introspection.
>Introspection.
Cf. >Psychological theories on emotion.

Found an error? Use our Complaint Form. Perhaps someone forgot to close a bracket? A page number is wrong?
Help us to improve our lexicon.
However, if you are of a different opinion, as regards the validity of the argument, post your own argument beside the contested one.
The correction will be sent to the contributor of the original entry to get his opinion about.