I 164
Color/Supervenience/Wright: Color supervenes other physical properties: E.g. there is a chaotic variety of physical conditions which is illustrated by scarlet things.
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Supervenience.
This conception is therefore weaker than that according to which color words have the semantics of concepts for natural kinds.
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Stronger/weaker, >
Natural kinds.
It's the commitment to the idea that physically identical objects share their color, even if one of the objects offers the "best" conditions and the others don't. This supervenience is therefore, as it were, a force towards the uniqueness of color concepts.
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Unabiguity, >
Colour words.
I 169
Color/Wright: However, I do not want to go so far as to assert that color predicates are semantically concepts for natural kinds.
That would also be inconsistent with the thesis that the extension is partially determined by the best opinion.
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Best explanation/Wright.
Color/Wright: for our everyday understanding of color words there is no such risk (that there is nothing red): if it turned out that there are no interesting physical properties that red things have in common, then we learn by that that red things are, in fact, not a natural species, but that there are still indeed infinitely many red things.
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Generality.
This statement is, however, entirely consistent with the belief that red things do indeed have interesting physical properties in common!
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Similarity, >
Properties.
The explanatory intuition does not have to be more than an epiphenomenon of the presumed accuracy of the conviction that something in which redness physically consists actually exists and that it is one of the reasons for the fact that there are best judgments about that which is red.
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Euthyphro contrast/Wright, >
Epiphenominology.
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II 247
Color Predicates/sorites/vagueness/Wright: a color word is not like "two meters long", but "less than two meters" (length ranges).
Criterion: still measuring! But we can also say without measuring what the result would be.
Solution/Wright: Actual distinction between cases where we can judge by eyesight, and cases where we cannot - then still observation predicates - which other base should this distinction provide?
Crispin Wright: thesis: the methodological approach must be completely behavioristic and anti-reflexive.
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Behaviorism, >
Perception, >
Sensory impressions, >
Judgments.
