Lexicon of Arguments

 

V 165f
Existence/ontology/criterion/AlstonVsQuine: Quine's translations, e.g. a) "length-in-miles-from" or b) "(Ex)(E is a ...)". 1. Alston: E-assumptions depend on statements, not on sentences. QuineVsVs: the translation shows that the prerequisite is made only seemingly. 2. AlstonVsQuine: the translation would allow to say everything possible, when you only reform it accordingly.
V 168
Searle (like Alston): there is no criterion of mere notation. (s) General direction: Searle: facts, not language is decisive. SearleVsQuine: e.g. then you can claim all the knowledge (W) and yet only presuppose this spring here: one defines a predicate P(x) = this spring and W. Then one takes (W) as an axiom and this spring = this spring as an axiom, then "this spring = this spring and axiom (W) then "P (this spring)" then "(Ex)(Px)". Problem: the knowledge can be represented in paraphrases, which then would have to have the same ontological prerequisite as the original. (s) QuineVsVs: the conditions are only made seemingly. AlstonVsQuine: what someone says is important not how he/she puts it.
Cf. >Ontology/Quine.
V 172
Ontological/epistemic/Searle: e.g. "Are there terrible snow men?" is an epistemic, not an ontological question.
>Ontologic/epistemic/Searle, >Fact.
V 173
Existence/ontology/Searle: there are no classes of irreducible existence conditions. >Ontology/Searle.