I 54
Existence: is from the standpoint of theory always a settlement. It can only be avoided by greater complexity. Arbitration: the method of arbitration: question of existence is question of evidence.
I 300
Existence: the category is dependent on the point of view, but not on the existence of the objects E.g. time period.
I 316
Existence: no claim of existence arises from the meaning of singular terms.
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Singular Terms/Quine.
I 402f
Existence: does not arise from the dichotomy "single thing" - "universalia" - it does not matter whether they exist. "Equator", "North Pole" - Linking with stimuli is a weak argument for primacy of physical objects but it makes terms accessible for all positions.
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Stimuli/Quine.
I 412
QuineVsProperties: there is a fallacy of subtraction: deriving existence from "about" and "is about" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but not also properties. "Round" and "dog" are general terms for objects and not singular terms for properties or classes.
The same argument would be true for classes instead of properties: Generic term symbolizes as much its extension as its intension.
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Classes/Quine, >
Properties/Quine, >
Singular Terms/Quine.
II 173
Existence: "All x are y" controversy: does this imply the existence of "x"? In medieval logic it does but not in modern times (thus one gains symmetry and simplicity).
VII (f) 110
Existence/Ontology/Quine: is only values of bound variables: not predicates "F", not statements "p", etc. because these are not the names of entities.
VII (i) 167
Existence/Quine: we can do without "a exists" when singular terms are included in description after translation.
VIII 31
Existence/Quine/(s): comes ultimately only from "The word appendicitis is a name" - but do names have to denote?
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Denotation/Quine.
IX 29
Existence/Ontology/Quine/(s): we cannot infer the quantity from the element. ((s) An existing thing may possibly belong to many quantities) - but the fact that we state the element implies its existence as a thing - then there is also {x: Fx} if it is to be an element of something.
IX 33
Existence/Quine: must not be confused with the property of being a quantity - and virtual classes must not be confused with extreme classes. Existence of a means being an element of ϑ (universal class). The property of being a quantity means that a is an element of something. Important argument: the whole point is that you do not know if ϑ is a something. If we postulate the existence of ϑ, i.e. ϑ ε ϑ, then, in fact, all things become quantities. Existent would then be the property of being a quantity. But if there are extreme classes at all now, then ϑ is not real, ϑ ε ϑ. ((s) absurd.)
IX 176
Definition/Existence/Quine: does not assume existence, but a description - Vs: even classes are not created by description.
IX 218
Existence/Quine: is for NF (New Foundations) plus extreme classes: the property of being a quantity:
IX 221
Existence/Quine: what was existence for NF (New Foundations), becomes only the property of being a quantity - i.e. where NF (New Foundations) said "{x: Fx} ε ϑ", we now have to say "^uFu ε Uϑ", and also limit all variables that can be hidden in the "F" to quantities (i.e. "Uϑ").
Lauener XI 128
Existence/Value of a bound variable/Quine/Lauener: since "exists" is not a predicate, we need quantification. Its logic is that of the existence quantifier. Quantifiers only receive meaning when the values of the variables are identifiable. Ideology: Part of the predicates - (as opposed to logical constants and quantifiers) - values of the variables are precisely the objects.
Lauener XI 130
Everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable because a predicate is an open sentence. Predicate variables only exist freely. Everything that exists are objects, not e.g. properties. >
Object/Quine.
