Lexicon of Arguments

 

Lauener XI 58
QuineVsEssentialism/Quantification/Lauener: quantification takes no account of the terminology - e.g. Fx is true if there is an object that satisfies that, no matter how it is called - e.g. 9 is the successor of 8 whether it is the number of planets or not.
>Quantification/Quine.
Lauener XI 175
Essentialism/singular term/general term/modal logic/Follesdal/Lauener: a semantics of modalities must distinguish between singular terms on the one hand and general terms and sentences on the other: i.e. between expressions that have a reference ((s) reference object) and expressions that have an extension ((s) a specifiable set).
>Singular Terms/Quine, >General Terms/Quine.
Quantification into opaque contexts/solution/FollesdalVsQuine: to be able to quantify into opaque contexts, we then have to make these contexts referentially transparent and at the same time extensionally opaque.
Essentialism: that is what essentialism means:
Def referential transparency/Follesdal/Lauener: what is true about an object applies to it, no matter how we refer to it.
Def extensional opacity/Follesdal/Lauener: among the predicates true of an object, some apply necessarily and others accidentally.
Quine VII (b) 21
QuineVsEssentialism: what is considered essential is arbitrary: a rational biped must be bipedal (because of its feet), but it does not have to be rational. The latter is relative.
VII (h) 151ff
QuineVsModal Logic: The modal logic makes essentialism necessary, i.e. one cannot do without necessary features of the objects themselves, because one cannot do without quantification. Actually, there is nothing necessary about the objects "themselves", but only in the way of reference.
VII (h) 156
Barcan formula: You have to accept an Aristotelian essentialism if you want to allow quantified modal logic. ((s) Therefore, Kripke calls himself an essentialist.) > Barcan formula.