Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 58
Essentialism/Terence Parsons/Cresswell: the doctrine that some things necessarily have a property that other things do not necessarily have.
Terence ParssonsVs: an essentialist theorem is false in a maximum model and there is a maximum model for each consistent set of closed nonmodal formulas. I.e. that no physical theory contains essentialism in relation to its predicates.
Problem: if we restrict the intended model by means other than axioms, it is not clear whether we can avoid essentialism.
>Unintended models.
I 59
Essentialism/necessity/possibility/Cresswell: comes through via the language that we build on the language of physics. Physics only provides the entities that we need for the semantics of their language.
The essentialism does not need to touch the question of the adequacy of a theory as complete framework of a physical description of the world.
>Adequacy, >Completeness.