Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 11f
McGinn thesis: confusion sets in not because philosophical questions refer to highly problematic, strange beings or facts, but because our cognitive faculties are subject to certain limits.
Transcendental Naturalism/"principle of cognitive specificity"/McGinn: indispensable background principle: every knowing being of earthly nature (not of divine nature) shows strong and weak areas of cognitive faculties that depend in the end on their biological equipment.
I 121f
That means that there is probably no such thing as "general intelligence".
>Intelligence.
Accordingly, systematic failure in one field does not depend on the objects.
Most things which we can understand have no semantic properties.
The problem of knowledge is reminiscent of the problem of freedom of will, which also has a kind of stimulus independence. Decisions come about of their own accord, they are not mere effects.
I 153
A priori knowledge/McGinn: is not derived from a causal input-output ratio and ignores the perception systems. And not because the stimuli are weak.
>a priori/McGinn.
At the same time, it is the realization of the solipsist, which is provided to each mind with sufficient inner strength.
I 178
Freedom of will/knowledge/McGinn: related problems: cracks and discontinuities, fragmentary data build an extensive knowledge system, the input values do not determine in any case the final state.
>Free will/McGinn.
I 222
Knowledge pluralism: suggests that it is not true that human reason contained nothing that would be capable of solving philosophical problems.
Secrets are secrets only for a particular ability. Maybe there are certain abilities that are philosophically more gifted than our conscious reason.