Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Theses I
Theses II

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Events/Action/Davidson: action is description-dependent (Mary-example: Mary shoots the lion and kills the cow). - In contrast: Events are independent of description. >Description dependence.

Glüer II 86 ff
VsEvent-Ontology: various authors: Events are actually superfluous, because adverbial modifications can also be realized with more economical ontology.
Montague, Clark, Parsons: "modifier theory": has no events, ia not restricted to "restrictive" adverbs, but more complex logical apparatus.
Jaegwon Kim: identifies events not as individualized individuals, but with the help of properties.
Davidson bases his entire philosophy on the ontology of particular events. >Ontology/Davidson.
Distinguishing between event token and description.
Only then, it is clear, what sense it makes to speak of variously described event tokens, as far as these descriptions contain no intentional adverbs.
Thus, there is no subclass of intentional actions. >Actions, >Intentions.
But Mary has long since stopped shooting when the burglar dies. But that does not change the fact that it is about descriptions of one and the same event token. The rest is left to nature.
  Mountaineer-Example: is a mere event, not an intentional action.
Event/Davidson: all events can be explained in principle with regard to the operations of the natural laws. (McDowell).
Glüer II 97
Def Events/Davidson/Glüer: an identity statement "a = b" for events is true iff a and b have identical causes and consequences - Glüer: then the causal relationship forms a coordinate system in which each event is uniquely determined - QuineVsDavidson: Regress: Causes and consequences are again events, which have again a place in the net - Davidson: VsDavidson: assumes Quine's criterion for objects:
Glüer II 89
Def Identity for objects/Quine: have the same space time coordinates - Event/Davidson/new: two events can happen at the same time in the same location. >Identification.
Glüer II 189
Problem: E.g. muscle soreness in singing running - Solution/Davidson: Language instead of coordinates - metaphysical ontological assumptions of everyday language.
Solution/Davidson: Description.
Glüer II 101
Description/event/Davidson: E.g. Mary shot at the burglar, but he dies much later. - Identity theory of the events: Problem: the same action - solution: these are descriptions of the same event tokens - Mary only needs to pull the trigger to kill, the rest does the nature.

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