Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II


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I 114
Ryle: sensations are behavioral dispositions. (RortyVs).
VI 407
You never know how red feels without knowing that it is different from blue, or that it is a color, etc.
There is no raw material of sensation.
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Frank I 597
Def sensation/Rorty: not perception (not acquisition of opinions), but the entities that we report with sentences like "I had a sensation of red". (Simple, unanalyzed).
Def perception/Rorty: acquisition of opinions (unlike simple sensation).
Frank I 600
Inner perception/Rorty: everything mental is internally perceptible and vice versa - but it is not a characteristic of the mental that e.g. the perception of an upset stomach is not considered a case of inner perception, because indeed the object is physical. - So we can only determine inner perception if we have previously clarified the concept of the mental. - Non-spatiality may not be a characteristic - e.g. mass has no shape. - Solution: no state of an object has a shape or size anyway.
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Rorty VI 407
Sensation/Rorty: there is no raw material of sensation. - Davidson: nevertheless senses play merely a causal role.

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