Lexicon of Arguments

 

Frank I 594
Disposition/realism/RortyVsArmstrong: the realistic conception of dispositions implies that physicalism must be true. - Then physicalism would be no empirical scientific truth (or theory) anymore.
>Physicalism, >Realism.
Frank I 595
Phenomenology/disposition/Armstrong: the phenomenalist, unlike the realist, cannot explain dispositions ((s) otherwise circular, because dispositions can also only be described) - He cannot explain why >counterfactual conditionals are true. >Phenomenalism.

Richard Rorty (I970b). Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424

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Rorty I 115
Disposition/RortyVsRyle: 1) no necessary (conceptual, linguistic) connection between sensation and disposition as between heat and redness.
>Sensation, >Necessity, >Necessity a posteriori, cf. >Feature (of a concept).
Rorty: nevertheless, behaviorism is on the track of something right - it makes clear that the question "mental or not mental" becomes pointless.
I 119
Dosposition/SellarsVsRyle/RortyVsRyle: his mistake was: proof of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states shows that there are no internal states in reality - (f.o.th.) - Wittgenstein: (PU § 308) the whole problem stems from the fact that we talk about things and leave their nature open.