Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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I 63
Thought/Nagel: one cannot escape it - that is different than making marks on paper.
I 65
Therefore "add two" cannot be considered a naturalistic event. - It cannot be considered separately from its contents. - Thinking is something else than making signs on paper. A naturalistic analysis of intentionality is not possible. (NagelVsSearle).
>Intentionality/Searle, >Intentionality, >Naturalism.
Nagel: The fallacy lies in the idea that one could escape the thought "add two" and comprehend it as naturalistically describable event.
I 93 ff
Thinking: thinking takes precedence over its description, because its description necessarily presupposes thinking.
>Description/Nagel.
I 101
Nagel: our thinking always inevitably leads to a view point where "I" is no longer relevant.
>I, Ego, Self.
One cannot consider any thought type to be merely personal, unless one assumes a non-personal view point.
Rorty VI 147
Language/thinking/Nagel: NagelVsWittgenstein/Rorty: the limits of language are not the limits of thought.
>Thinking without language.

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