Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 7
That-clause/relational theory/Schiffer: tradition: a that-clause is a singular term. - E.g. That snow is white has a reference that can be true/false.
Paratactic analysis/Davidson: "that", demonstrative, refers to an occurrence.
SchifferVs: this leads to the relation theory - (it presupposes objects of belief).
>Relation theory.
Since there is an infinite number of relational predicates, these cannot appear as basic terms.
>Compositionality.
I 9
That-clause/Schiffer: a that-clause is no singular term but indirect and partial characterization of what Elmer believes.
>Paul and Elmer)
I 274
de dicto/Schiffer: reduction to de dicto is only possible if a way of givenness without reference to objects of which they are about, is possible.
>Substitutional quantification, >Way of givenness.

I 129
That-clause/belief/most authors/Schiffer: the that-clause does not refer to a belief. - That means to the neuronal state-token which is the belief. - But to entities with truth value and other content-determining characteristics.
Problem: then we need (unlike propositions) an independent presentation of the contents of the neural state-Tokens.

I 211
That-clause/Schiffer: Thesis: a that-clause does not refer. It is no refering expression.
Problem: how should one explain:
E.g. Paul and Elmar believe that ... so there is an attribute that they have in common.
Nominalism: for nominalism, which denies any classes of properties, the language must not a have compositional semantics.
>Compositionality.