Lexicon of Arguments

 

II 157
That-clause/Field: does not require a literal representation - e.g. "that snow is white" can be expressed in every language; it is speech-independent.
Then a language (M_s) with ""p" means that p" is a special case of the language (M) with ""e" (whereby e is a subsentential expression and means, for example, "dog."
That is, "<>" is a formal representation of our normal means of meaning attribution.
((s) the expression in tip brackets is our own.)
Scheme characters: "p" and "e" here in relation to an individual, i.e. idiolect.
>Idiolect, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention.
II 158
Then "that p as I understand it now" must not be a literal representation. Tip bracket: it cannot be shown that "metacompact" does not mean , even if I do not know exactly what it means.
I.e it has a particular epistemic status: it is not empirically doubtful. To say that a word means "rabbit," is simply to say...
II 159
...that it means the same as "rabbit" as I understand it in the actual moment. - ((s) In the actual world, in my idiolect).
>Possible worlds, >Actual world, >Language community.
II 160
Tip brackets: instead, for sentences, we can also assume that-clauses.
II 171
Understanding: For example, if I do not understand "grug", I will not accept the following: "grug" means - and even if I accept it, it would not count as believe.
>Content.