Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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I 117
Continuant/Broad: a continuant has no temporal parts, only spatial parts. Contrast: event: an event has spatial and temporal parts.
Continuant: e.g. human. N.B.: that is why he is able to change. ((s) Otherwise there is the question of whether he remains the same.)
>Temporal identity, >Personal identity.
Contrast: occurrence/Broad: an event cannot change. ((s) A human (continuant) can grow old - an event cannot grow old.)
>Humans, >Events, >Persons.
I 127
Continuants/SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: things that can have mass are continuants and they are used in the argument of the Relativity Theory that nothing which has a mass can be accelerated beyond the speed of light.
>Four-dimensionalism, >Relativity Theory.
I 173
Continuants/Locke: continuants are constant clusters of matter. They cannot lose or gain any parts (SimonsVsLocke).
>J. Locke.
I 175
Temporal Part/continuants/mereology/SimonsVsAll other authors: thesis: even continuants can have temporal parts, i.e. they are not mereologically constant, but mereologically variable.
Simons: thesis: continuants can also have an interrupted existence.
>Existence.
I 176
Continuants/Simons: not all continuants have to be material things, e.g. smile, nodes, waves: they are rather disruptions of material things.
I 180
Def coincidence/continuants/Simons: coincidence predicate:

CTD5 a ‹ ›t b ≡ a ‹t ∧ b ‹t a

For a similarity of parts in terms of the mutual inclusion see Identity/Simons.
I 187
Continuant/ChisholmVsAll other authors: thesis: a continuant is mereologically constant. Mereologically variable continuants are not really primary substances, but rather logical constructions of mereologically constant continuants. Organisms are only constructions.
I 305
Event/continuants/Simons: event: here, a formula like "a‹b" is complete. Continuants: we need an additional time index here: ((s) with quantification) "(∃t)[a‹t b]".
I 350
Continuant/Simons: events happen to a person and are called their life (or life story). Context: not all events of a life are causally connected. Solution: genetic identity (gene-identical): i.e. all events involve a single continuant.
I 351
Continuant/temporal relationship/Simons: it is not the continuant, which belongs together, but its life story.
HumeVsContinuants, RussellVsContinuants: continuants bring about a reduction to events, they are mere clotheslines. Whether a continuant exists depends on whether there is a life story to it.
I 353
Simons: nothing maintains their continuous existence.

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