Lexicon of Arguments

 

IV 41
Modal continuants/Lewis/(s): if individuals can consist of the mereological sum of all their counterparts, they could also be modal continuants.
LewisVs: Problem: If I am part of countless different modal continuants, which am I then myself?
Solution/Lewis: (see e.g. Methuselah):
Instead of identity we take the common sharing of states. Then there is only one individual.
Modal continuants/Problem: everything that could have happened does happen.
E.g. Humphrey/Kripke: Humphrey thinks: "I could have won" - i.e.: - I am an modal continuant with a world state that wins - i.e. the mC of which a world state is thinking these thoughts has a (different) world state that wins.
LewisVs: Humphrey thinks only of himself, so it is pointless to assume that he was "part of the same mereological sum as the winner".
>Mereological sum.
IV 42
Counterpart theory/Lewis: according to it, Humphrey himself has properties such that he has potential winners as counterparts.
>Counterpart theory/Lewis, >Counterpart/Lewis.
ersatz world: are those in which the same Humphrey just lived a different story.
>ersatz world/Lewis.
IV 76
Person state/continuant/Lewis: a state is not a permanent person - e.g. a person with a desire is a state - (person state, person-state).
>Personal identity.