Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

Concept/Author*  

What is wrong?
Page
Other metadata
Translation
Excerpt or content
Other

Correction: Year / Place / Page
/ /

Correction:
(max 500 charact.)

Your username*
or User-ID

Email address*

The complaint
will not be published.

 
II 48
Bivalence/Dummett: according to Dummett, bivalence is the hallmark of realism.
Quine: I do not care much about bivalence, mainly it is good for simplification. In addition to the undecidable facts of the realists with regard to physical objects, the vagueness of the terms must be taken into account. Here, too, there are problems due to bivalence:
Sorites: Example, if a heap always remains after removal of a single grain from a sand heap, it follows by means of complete induction that a heap remains after removal of all grains. Bivalence seals the paradox, since it demands that in every phase the heap must be either true or false. Solution: the paradox is generally brought about by vague terms. >Paradoxes/Quine.
II 50
Thinking as if our terms were precise does not seem to be further complicated as long as we see that they can be clarified by arbitrary definitions.
II 52
Bivalence: Bivalence is nevertheless a fundamental feature of our scientific world. This is not a problem in the liberal sense. Frege: every general term applies or not. All terms are vague by ostension.
It is not a matter of convention, nor of inscrutable but objective facts. Nevertheless, we cannot avoid seeing the table as one and not another. That is how it is with bivalence.
II 53
Bivalence is a basic feature of our classical scientific theories. True/False Dichotomy. In accordance with our scientific theories, we consider all such propositions as if they had a factual content. And even if it is so far from observation. This is in the interests of simplicity.
II 54
The concept of the physical object in the liberal sense does not entail any embarrassment, since it understands all candidates indiscriminately as a "table".
X 115
Trivalent logic: cancels the classic bivalence.
Negation/multi-valued logic/Quine: could we defend it so that we define it to be true exactly when the negated sentence is not true?
Vs: this leads to the desired meaning, but is based on a circle: we use the classic "not", which the dissenter rejects.
X 115
Bivalence/multi-valued logic/Quine: doubts about bivalence are often weakly justified.
1. Vs Sentence of the excluded middle/VsSaD: worst justification: that there are always intermediate stages.
2. Vs Sentence of the excluded middle: otherwise there would be a confusion of knowledge and truth.
>Excluded Middle/Quine.
X 116
Quine pro extreme realism: we can take the view that each of the sentences of which we do not know the answer is either true or false.
3. Vs Sentence of the excluded middle: to take it more seriously: justification from the antinomies of set theory and semantics:
Russell's Antinomy/Bovcar: (1939): middle truth value for "~(x ε x)".
QuineVs: this violates the "principle of minimal mutilation": the antinomies come from set theory and semantics, let us try to solve them there, and not paralyse the functioning of complete logic.
4. Quantum Mechanics Vs Sentence of the excluded middle: is an uncertainty relation. Certain quantities cannot be measured simultaneously. Thus it seems superfluous and misleading to maintain the classical logical apparatus.
Birkhoff/v.Neumann: (1936): weakened replacement for the truth-functional logic; it is not a multi-valued logic but not a truth function.
PopperVs: that does not do what it is supposed to do.

Found an error? Use our Complaint Form. Perhaps someone forgot to close a bracket? A page number is wrong?
Help us to improve our lexicon.
However, if you are of a different opinion, as regards the validity of the argument, post your own argument beside the contested one.
The correction will be sent to the contributor of the original entry to get his opinion about.