Lexicon of Arguments

 

II 103
Principle of Bivalence/Truth/Dummett: PoB already presumes the concept of truth. - And that is transcendental in the case of undecidable sentences. - It goes beyond our ability to recognize what a manifestation would be. >Decidability.
II 103f
Undecidability/anti-realism/Dummett: (without bivalence) The meaning theory will then no longer be purely descriptive in relation to our actual practice.
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III (a) 17
Sense/Frege: Explanation of sense by truth conditions. - Tractatus: dito: "Under which circumstances...". >Truth conditions, >Circumstances.

DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: For that one must already know what the statement that P is true means.
Vs: if they then say P is true means the same as asserting P.
VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what should be explained.
VsRedundancy theory: we must either supplement it (not merely explain the meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence. >Redundancy theory.
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III (b) 74
Sense/Reference/Bivalence/Dummett: bivalence: Problem: not every sentence has such a sense that in principle we can recognize it as true if it is true (e.g. >unicorns, >Goldbach’s conjecture).
But Frege’s argument does not depend at all on bivalence.
III (b) 76
Bivalence, however, works for elementary clauses: if here the semantic value is the extension, it is not necessary to be possible to decide whether the predicate is true or not - perhaps application cannot be effectively decided, but the (undefined) predicate can be understood without allocating the semantic value (truth value) - therefore distinction between sense and semantic value. >Semantic Value.
Cf. >Multi valued logic.