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Consciousness/Block: a zombie can have consciousness - SearleVs: states of consciousness always have content - but the "of" is not always one of intentionality: e.g. not in case of pain, because it is not outside.
Consciousness does not need to be naturalized, it is completely natural.
Consciousness/McGinn: is a kind of substance - the substance itself is recognized by introspection - but we cannot recognize the connection in principle - SearleVsMcGinn: 1) Consciousness is not a substance, but a feature of the brain - 2) Consciousness is not recognized by introspection.
Space/Time/Consciousness: Asymmetry: consciousness is temporal, but not spatial (Kant, Searle).
Fulfillment Conditions/Searle: properties of the objects are fulfillment conditions of my experiences, therefore difficult to distinguish from the property of the experiences (these always in perspective) -Consciousness reflects the fulfillment conditions. Consciousness is not always intentional: e.g. depression.
I 168 ff
Consciousness/Searle: has nothing to do with incorrigibility and introspection - Self-deception requires Cartesian dualism.
I 198 ff
Background: Skills and abilities that allow the consciousness to function (e.g. understanding pictures (uphill/downhill?) - the same real meaning determines different fulfillment conditions in different backgrounds - background: is not itself intention, "to be assumed" not explicit propositional content, not explicit belief (objects are fixed) - Network: additional knowledge (cannot interpret itself) network intentional, no ability (even during sleep) ("Bush is Predsident").