Rorty I 60
Consciousness: Antiquity had no name for it.
- - -
III 37/38
RortyVsRyle/RortyVsDennett: their doubts about whether there is something like ’mind’ or ’consciousness’ have to do with the idea of a medium between the self and reality, a medium that realists consider to be transparent and skeptics to be opaque.
>
Mental states/Dennett, >
Consciousness/Dennett, >
Mental states/Ryle, >
Consciousness/Ryle.
Rorty: there is no medium.
- - -
VI 176
Consciousness/Rorty: What outcome do we want to see as a result of our research? Why would we want to change our intuitive conceptions? Neither intuition nor ambitious pursuit yield an Archimedean point.
- - -
Frank I 584
Consciousness/Rorty: does not really exist in the sense of a separate area of the mental - mental events are conventions, a contingent language play - thesis: it can be abolished without loss.
Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424
- - -
Rorty I 132
Mental/Ryle/Rorty: thesis: mental states like opinions, desires, etc. are properties not of the consciousness but of the person.
>
Mind/Mind state.
III 37
Consciousness/mind/RortyVsRyle/RortyVsDennett: mind or consciousness are not a medium between oneself and reality. >
Mind.
III 67
Consciousness/Kant/Rorty: two parts:
a) reasonable: same in everyone
b) empirically contingent.
In contrast: Freud: treats rationality as a mechanism that adjusts contingencies to other contingencies.
Plato: (State) conscience = internalized parents and society.
Reason/Kant: general principles
FreudVsKant: return to the special.
Kant: honest people are paradigmatic.
Freud: nothing human is paradigmatic.
VI 147
Consciousness/behavior/Wittgenstein/Rorty: wrong question: Is the behavior a different fact than consciousness? - Wittgenstein: we should not try to come between language and object.
