I 49
Consciousness/mind-body problem/McGinn: there seem to be no properties of physical organisms from which consciousness could arise under certain circumstances.
Now, it is also difficult to specify exactly which property of consciousness ensures that it refuses a physical explanation.
I 52
Consciousness/McGinn: Problem: what is the real hallmark of a state of consciousness? Where is the problem located? "What is it like to be a K?"
I 56
Consciousness/McGinn: Problem: how is it possible that states whose condition is associated with "being-like" emerge from states where there is no "being-like"?
Cf. >
"What is it like to be a bat?", >
Knowing how, >
Experience.
I 68
Consciousness/McGinnVsSearle: states of consciousness do not allow emergence-theoretical explanations with mereological terms. We are unable to reduce pain to the underlying neural units.
On the contrary to that it is quite possible to explain the higher-level properties of liquids in this way. (s) because all levels are easily accessible to us. States of consciousness can therefore not be explored according to Combinatorial Atomism with lawlike mappings. We can well understand higher-level brain functions from their constituents, but if we start with consciousness, this explanation fails.
>
Explanation.
I 74
Mind/brain/meaning/reference/McGinn: so according to this view, there is no referent that would ever raise a philosophical problem of its own, because the objective world is not a problem from a philosophical point of view.
Philosophical problems arise from the meanings in the light of which we understand the world.
It is not the soul as a referent to which the mystery clings.
>
Philosophy.
Consciousness/McGinn: is theoretically unfathomable, because we do not understand what kind of relationship would be capable of linking experience with the world in a way that is given by our imagination when we talk about knowledge.
I 192
What does it really mean for my mind to put itself in the position of the world?
Since we receive no response, there is the notion that our cognitive powers are directed entirely inwards. However, this retreat is a deception according to transcendental naturalism.
>
Terminology/McGinn.
- - -
II 68
If the only thing on which we had relied was brain research, we would never even have got the idea that the brain houses a consciousness at all.
I 86ff
Knowledge/awareness/McGinn: even complete knowledge of ourselves would not let us look better in terms of consciousness.
>
Awareness/Chalmers.
II 216
Consciousness is not a property that depends on its origin.
>
Artificial consciousness.
