Gadamer I 248
Consciousness/Husserl/Gadamer: According to Husserl's own statement(1), it was the a priori-correlation of experience-object and given facts, which dominated his whole life-work since the logical investigations. Already in the fifth logical investigation he had worked out the peculiarity of intentional experiences and distinguished consciousness, as he made it a research topic, "as an intentional experience"(...) from the real unit of consciousness of experiences and from their inner perception.
In this respect, consciousness was not an "object" for him but an essential assignment (...). What was revealed in the research of this attribution was a first overcoming of "objecivism" in so far as, for instance, the meaning of words was not connected with the real psychic content of consciousness, e.g. the
Gadamer I 249
associative notions that a word evokes were allowed to be confused for a longer time.
Intention of meaning and fulfillment of meaning essentially belong to the unity of meaning, and, like the meanings of the words that we use, every being that is valid for me has, correlatively and in essence, an "ideal generality of the real and possible experiencing modes of giving"
(2). >
Phenomenology/Husserl.
1. Husserliana VI. 169.
2. Ibid.
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Tugendhat I 165
Consciousness/Husserl: a sensual act is the imagination of objects. Categorical acts are acts of thought or the stating of facts. They are not sensual, they are differently composed than objects but they are real, if the objects are real.
I 173f
TugendhatVsHusserl: VsCategorical Act (categorical synthesis): instead of categorical acts he assumes a semantic form, rather than an "ideal composition": criterion: a relation exists when the appropriate sentence is true.
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Adorno XIII 61
Consciousness/Husserl/Adorno: according to Kant, a single consciousness is only founded by memory in its unity and thus uniform experience is made possible.
Husserl later expresses that consciousness is itself a piece of the world.
Adorno: they presuppose (...) what they first want to establish in the doctrine of idealism.
Idealism/Adorno: idealism was thus a bit in the situation of Münchhausen, who wanted to pull himself out of the swamp by his plait, i.e. he must develop his constitutive forms from the individual consciousness. (See also
Subjectivity/Adorno,
Idealism/Adorno,
Mind/Adorno,
Hegel/Adorno).
