Lexicon of Arguments

 

I (e) 105
States of consciousness such as doubts, desires, beliefs are partly identified by the social context of their appropriation, like other states are identified by their causes, such as snow blindness.
1. States of consciousness such as doubts, desires, beliefs are partly identified by the social context of their appropriation, similarly as other states are identified by their causes, such as snow blindness.
I 106
2. This does not prove that states of consciousness are not physical states! How we identify them is not directly related to the location of these states.
3. The fact that states of consciousness are identified on the basis of their causal relations to objects of the outside world is an essential fact for the possibility of communication.
4. The separation of schema and content is an error resulting from the image that the mind is a passive observer of an inner spectacle. A naturalistic explanation of knowledge does not refer to epistemological mediation instances, type of sensory data, etc.
5. There are no "objects of thought" as ghostly entities modelled on sensory data or anything else.
What remains of subjectivity? Thoughts are private. The knowledge of thoughts is something asymmetrical. Thoughts nevertheless belong to a common public world.
The mere possibility of thoughts demands common standards of truth and objectivity.

>Doubts, >Desire, >Beliefs, >Intentions, >Mental states, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mentalism.