Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

Concept/Author*  

What is wrong?
Page
Other metadata
Translation
Excerpt or content
Other

Correction: Year / Place / Page
/ /

Correction:
(max 500 charact.)

Your username*
or User-ID

Email address*

The complaint
will not be published.

 
I 112
Consciousness/Chisholm: all my opinions are direct attributions - I am the subject of these attributions, but not their content. >Content, >I, Ego, Self, >Attribution.
I/ChisholmVsDescartes: no certain propositions about themselves - existence also not property I am sure of - consciousness defined through self-presenting property - no direct access.
I 130
Consciousness/unity/Chisholm: a person who realizes that they see something and realizes that they hear something is also aware that they see and hear something - Outsourcing/Mention/Use - Chisholm: but it is not sure that consciousness is the same.
I 133
Self-awareness: goes beyond direct attribution: subject must know that the properties are attributed to itself. >Awareness, >Self-consciousness.
I 131f
Consciousness/Unit/Kant: the subject does not need to unite the ideas, but it must be able to - self-awareness: a) direct attribution of a property, b) going further: here, the subject must also know that it is the object of direct attribution itself - Accuracy results from observation, many people never observe.
- - -
II 193 ff
Two-Aspects Doctrine/Fechner: People have inner (mental) and external aspects (not two sides of the same coin) - they differ only by point of view! (No identity theory) - both do not have to be based on a being - VsFechner: only interesting if yet another sense can be connected to the "inner" - Fechner: being is monistic - but also:
FechnerVsMonism: only makes sense if the world is perceived uniformly - as self-appearance, everything is ultimately spirit. >Aspects, >Monism, >Dualism, >Anomalous monism.
II 198f
FeiglVsFechner: all his examples are basically for external things! (Fechner has seen that himself) - also the interior of the body is physical. - So the crucial difference does not even exist.
Fechner: ultimately only metaphorical.


Stubenberg, Leopold. Chisholm, Fechner und das Geist-Körper-Problem. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986

Found an error? Use our Complaint Form. Perhaps someone forgot to close a bracket? A page number is wrong?
Help us to improve our lexicon.
However, if you are of a different opinion, as regards the validity of the argument, post your own argument beside the contested one.
The correction will be sent to the contributor of the original entry to get his opinion about.