I 52
Naming/Denotation/Two-Names Theory/GeachVsAristoteles: Incorrect approximation of predication and naming: as if predicates were (complex) names : "on the mat".
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Naming, >
Predication, >
Attribution, >
Names, >
Predicates, >
Aristotle.
((s) "The man stabbing Caesar to death stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus.")
Geach: Additionally, Geach would use a link.
Two-names theory/Aristotle/Geach: "Socrates is a philosopher" should be true because the thing is named.
GeachVs: "Philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or every) philosopher".
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General terms.
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I 153f
Intentionality/naming/Parmenides/Geach: one cannot name anything that does not exist. (Geach pro) - ((s) Existence introduction is not arbitrary, not without premise).
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Existence, >
Existence statement, >
Existence/Parmenides, >
Introduction, >
Nonexistence, >
Fiction.
E.g. Geach dreamed of a girl and wants to call it "Pauline". - On the other hand, acquaintance is sufficient - presence is not necessary.
Problem: is the girl even more imaginary, if he has not dreamed of her?
Geach: that is a sure sign that this is all nonsense.
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Objects of thought, >
Objects of belief.
Geach with Parmenides: "There is only that what exists."
GeachVsParmenides: However, one can talk about non-existent objects. - E.g. talking about absent friends without knowing that he is dead, changes the truth value, but not the fact that these are sentences.
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Truth value, >
Reference.
Imaginary girls are not competing for identification in the dream. - If it is true of no identifiable girl that I dreamed of her, then I have not dreamed of any girl.
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de re, >
de dicto, >
Identification.
Solution: "I dreamed of a girl, but it is not true of a certain girl that I dreamed of her". - This is similar to: it is not true of a certain stamp that I want it.
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I 252
Predication/Geach: predication can be done without naming: in an if-that-sentence or in an or-sentence, a term P can be predicated of a thing without naming the thing "P".
E.g. "If that what the policeman said is true, then he drove faster than 60". This does not call the policeman's sentence true. - (>
Conditional).
Predication/naming: centuries-old error: that the predicate is uttered by the thing.
Frege: Difference >
naming / >
predication, >
designation: to name a thing "P", a sentence must be asserted!
But a property is also predicted in a non-assertive sub-clause (subset).
Therefore, naming must be explained by predication, not vice versa.
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Naming.