I 26ff
It is not the case that P is T iff it is not the case that P is T.
This is not valid for justified assertibility from right to left. Assertibility is naturally weaker.
>
Asymmetry, >
Equivalence, >
Implication.
I 26
Justified Assertibility/Negation: Ignorance: P is not justifiably assertible, but neither is its negation.
>
Negation, >
Justification.
Truth/Ignorance: something may very well be true, even though nothing is known about it.
>
Realism, >
Metaphysical realism.
Truth/Justified Assertibility: E.g. snow is white: the decision about truth and assertibility may diverge here.
I 51
Deflationism: "true" only means of affirmation, therefore not a standard different from assertibility.
>
Truth, cf. >
Redundancy theory.
A statement can be justified without being true and vice versa.
>
Conventions, cf. >
Language use, >
Language community.
---
Field II 120
Assertibility/Wright/Putnam: is the only substantial property. - Because truth is not a property. - Field: both do go next to each other, because they diverge - truth goes deeper.
- - -
Wright I 35
Justified Assertibility/Assertibility/Negation: E.g. it is not the case that P is T iff. it is not the case that P is T - This is not valid for justified assertibility from right to left - in case of ignorance, the negation is not assertible either.
I 52ff
Truth: timeless - justified assertibility: not timeless.
>
Timelessness.
I 68ff
Def Super-Assertibility: a statement is super-assertible if it is justified or can be justified and if its justification survived both any scrutiny of its descent and arbitrarily extensive additions and improvements to the information.
Cf. >
Justified assertibility.
Ideal Circumstances/Putnam: are timeless.
Super-Assertibility is no external standard, but our own practice. It is
metaphysically neutral.
I 81ff
Super-Assertibility/Wright: Thesis: comic and moral truths can be considered as varieties of super-assertibility. - ((s) Because everything we can learn in the future comes from our own practice, we are immune to fundamental surprises.)
I 102f
Super-Assertibility/Wright: suitable for discourses whose standards are made by us: morals, humor.
>
Morals.
I 115ff
Super-Assertibility/Field/Mackie: the T predicates for mathematics or morality cannot be interpreted in terms of the superassertibility. - Therefore, the super-assertible need not be true in discourse. - The difference Ssuperassertibility/truth goes back to this.
>
Mathematics, >
Truth, >
Discourse.
