Brandom I 197
VsJustified Assertibility: Assertibilty conditions do not contain the entire meaning. >Assertibility conditions.
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Rorty I ~ 325
(According to Rorty): assertible/Brandom/Rorty: in addition to the term "assertible" for the pure philosophy of language we still need "true". Especially for understanding how the language works as opposed to understanding how it spreads to the world. (Semantics/epistemology).
Also naive: distinguishing the assertibility conditions of a statement as "descriptive meaning" and the consequences as "evaluative" importance, and thus abandon any need for harmony.
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Brandom II 238
Assertibility Theories/Brandom: Thesis semantics must be oriented towards pragmatics (Brandom pro). >
Pragmatics.
II 240
Two tasks: 1. assertive force, i.e. declaring accuracy, i.e. making a distinction between traits at all 2. saying when those traits are allowed.
II 241
a) what are the reasons, evidence b) directly ask whether a statement is true - "semantic assertibility"/Sellars: assertibility under ideal conditions.
II 242
BrandomVsSellars: hopeless: you cannot specify ideality; either it remains circular with recourse to the notion of truth, or trivial. (Also BrandomVsHabermas).
II 243
Brandom's own approach: Thesis rule-governed language game that allows to combine propositional contents that are objective in the sense that they detach from the settings of the speaker with declarative sentences - which splits assertibility into two parts: determination and authorization (two normative statuses) - goes beyond Behth, because it allows the distinction between right and wrong use. - (> Dummett:>
chess).
II 254f
Semantic Theories/Assertibility/Brandom: Pro: Advantage: close connection to use - Problem: Dilemma: either a) linked to attitude or b) to the object - N.B.: Same assertibility conditions, but different truth conditions - the object could be red without me being able to say it. >
Truth conditions
II 259
Solution: Conditional: "If the pattern is red, it is red" - Tautology: this is correct because it codifies a definition preserving inference - but not:
II 260
"If I am entitled to the assertion that the pattern is red, it is red"- not definition preserving.
II 261
Distinction between authorization and definition does not need the notion of truth.
II 261
BrandomVsAssertibility: does not distinguish between the status of the definition/authorization without the aid of incompatibilities (negation).
Distinction between sentences that share the assertibility conditions and those that share the truth condition is not possible without the notion of truth. >
Truth.
