Lexicon of Arguments

 

Cresswell II 56
Meanings/Fodor/Cresswell: FodorVsPutnam: thesis: meanings are in the head.
>Putnam: "meanings ain't in the head", >Twin earth.
CresswellVsFodor: problem with the ascription, I will have to have the same representation in the head. It must have the same belief as the one he has (meanings are not representations).
>Representations, >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought.
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IV 57
Meaning/Quine: meaning does not arise from speaker meaning, no acceptance of inferences of the speaker. The speaker meaning depends on the worldview, and thus of an intention what the words should mean. It cannot distinguish between the views the speaker accepted a priori and those he accepted later. So there are no analytic sentences, there is no epistemic criteria for “true by meaning”. >Speaker meaning, >Analyticity/syntheticity.
IV 117
Meaning/truth/Davidson: a speaker holds a sentence to be true because of the meaning and because of his/her belief. So we cannot conclude from utterance meaning if we do not know the beliefs of the speaker and we cannot do it the other way around.
IV 121
Belief ascription/attribution of meaning/Davidson's theory: information about the shape of the words which are held to be true are the decisive evidence for both attributions here. The adoption of sincerity alone is not enough to detect meaning. We need information either about his/her belief or about the meanings.
Fodor/LeporeVsLewis: then the primacy thesis is implausible (primacy thesis: "the conditions of intentional attribution include the conditions for belief ascription"). >Attribution, >Belief ascription.