Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Theses I
Theses II

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I 89
Attributive Meaning/Chisholm: the property of being-F is the attributive meaning of the expression T in a language L if it is true for every object that 1) it is only designated with it if it has that property, 2) every speaker then assumes the property.
I 90
Name: Important Argument: not valid for names. >Proper names, >Reference, >Meaning.
I 108
Annemary has no attributive meaning, therefore there is no property of "loving Annemary." >Ontology/Chisholm.
- - -
II 112
Referential/Attributive/Brandl: based on reports: only attributive - in addition, there are still the cases of "whoever it is" - according to this, both, ref and att, are based on a de-re belief - i.e. we cannot say that att only covers one area that is only possible with de-dicto use.
II 112
Attributive/Brandl: works only with de dicto-use, not if the speaker knows the object - whoever it is: "area" does not work: neither seen object nor from report - distinction ref/att is to be made within de-re statements - but we must always know what role the reference plays in the concrete case.
II 120
Referential/Donnellan/Brandl: here, the speaker must not only know what the object designated by him is, but he must also know it - only then belief de-re "of the smallest spy" possible.
II 123
Contradiction to the above: only ref. if the speaker can take from reports of others who it is about.
II 126
Referential is the basic form of every reference - BrandlVs: this is the reductionist variant.
II 125
Attributive/Brandl: here, the "directedness" of the description function depends on the expressions - (borderline case) - with that, the speaker refers to an object, because he knows that he is also the only one to fulfill another description - ( "epistemically close": "epistemic familiarity": even without acquaintance, by source of information - then knowledge possible that it is one and the same, from acquaintance and from description.) >Description.


II Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

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