Lexicon of Arguments

 

VI 76
Cognitive Equivalence: is the replacement of a sentence by another. One should not interfere with the empirical content. QuineVs: this is not sure because a representative function is possible - instead: synonymy of stimuly - (but this is only for occasion sentences). Afterwards cognitive synonymy is possible also for terms but not for timeless sentences.
X 21ff
Sentence Equivalence/QuineVs: in everyday language there is no basic order (like pixels in a photo) - you cannot assign the sensual proof clearly to individual sentences ((s) formulations) - Quine: Because of the network of theories - (>underdetermination of empiricism).
II 66
Sentence Equivalence: when are two sentences considered equivalent? Frequent answer: if their use is the same! Or, if the stimuli are the same. Obviously it does not work that way! The two sentences cannot be uttered at the same time. The utterance of one must exclude that of the other! Moreover, at every opportunity when one of the two possible sentences has been uttered, there must be a reason, however trivial, for the utterance of one instead of the other!
We are obviously asking too much when we are asking for all the irritations in question to be identical. In any case, one criterion would be illusory in practice if it demanded that the stimulus conditions are actually being compared.
All in all, statements are practically unpredictable. The motives for the utterance of a sentence can vary inscrutably. Solution/Quine: >Cognitive Equivalence:
II 67
Cognitive Equivalence: here we are spared speculations about motives and circumstances. Instead, we can arrange circumstances and say sentences ourselves. If you make a mistake with your verdicts, it does not matter, you will make a mistake with both sentences.
II 68
Def Cognitive Equivalence: two occasional sentences are cognitively equivalent if they cause consent or rejection on every occasion.
>Cognition/Quine.
II 45ff
Empirical equivalence of theories: is discovered when one discovers the possibility of reinterpretation. Both theories are true, but may be logically incompatible.