Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

Concept/Author*  

What is wrong?
Page
Other metadata
Translation
Excerpt or content
Other

Correction: Year / Place / Page
/ /

Correction:
(max 500 charact.)

Your username*
or User-ID

Email address*

The complaint
will not be published.

 
Horwich I 462
Anti-Realism/Dummett/RortyVsDummett: rather refers to values - realism rather to chairs.
>Values, >Objcets, cf. >Realism.
- - -
Rorty I 305
Anti-Realism/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam does not understand antique and our modern theories as two roughly correct descriptions of a fixed set, but he does not believe that our theory is better in relation to the same entities.
But if our theory is just our theory, then we might as well ask the Neanderthals instead.
>Pragmatism, >Truth.
PutnamVsAnti-Realism: the problem is that for antirealism truth only makes sense as a subordinate concept to theories.
But extension is indissolubly linked to truth: x belongs to the extension of a predicate F precisely when " x is an F" is true.
((s) Anti-realism is understood differently here than with Dummett).

Problem: changing extension is senseless. - justified assertibility can change.
PutnamVs equating truth with justified assertibility.
>Extension, >Anti-Realism/Dummett.
- - -
VI 406
Per distinction realism/anti-realism: Dummett, Nagel (vsGadamer, VsDavidson)
Vs distinction realism/anti-realism: Rorty, Davidson.

Found an error? Use our Complaint Form. Perhaps someone forgot to close a bracket? A page number is wrong?
Help us to improve our lexicon.
However, if you are of a different opinion, as regards the validity of the argument, post your own argument beside the contested one.
The correction will be sent to the contributor of the original entry to get his opinion about.