Lexicon of Arguments

 

Rorty I 255
Similarity/Rorty: sufficient: the expectation system should be abstract and complicated in the same sense because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent from the physical uniformities of the stimuli among one another. >Stimuli.
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Fodor IV 18f
Sameness/similarity/everyday language studies/intentionality/Fodor/Lepore: problem: in order to state similarity, identity must already have been defined. Problem: believing almost the same: requires countability and identity of beliefs, e.g. when someone asks you a color, you would answer something like "red". Problem: we have no idea what the truth conditions would be for these generalizations! Therefore, we cannot do without identity in favor of an equality solution: we need a yet-to-be-found stricter concept of similarity (with respect to beliefs or semantic entities) ((s)> VsAnalyticity).
Holism: if he is right, the concept "token of the same type" is defined only if all beliefs are shared. Problem: they are almost of the same type. >Holism.
IV 123
Similarity/functional role/causal/association/Hume/Fodor/Lepore: analog: what a mental picture reminds you of does not depend on what role it plays in mental processes. Hume: but the causal role depends on what the image is associated with; and an idea (imagination) can easily be associated with anything that is consistent with its content. Conclusion: the truth conditions are independent of the causal role. Hume is not a functionalist in terms of content. Fodor/Lepore: no one believes today, that the content of a representation depends on what it reminds someone of. Only exception: is connectionism. >Connectionism.