@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Churchland,Paul}, subject = {Elimination}, note = {Schiffer I 159 Eliminativism/Churchland/Schiffer: (Paul Churchland 1981)(1): his eliminativism is quite different from that of Quine: Here the irreducibility of intentional vocabulary is denied. Folk Psychology/Churchland: is a functional theory. Belief is a functional state, with a functional role but future neuroscience will show that no inner states have these roles and therefore the folk psychology is wrong. Schiffer: this is a completely different route to eliminativism than that belief cannot be realized physically because our intentional vocabulary was irreducible. I 164 ... SchifferVsChurchland: his eliminativism would then have the consequence that no one believes anything. 1. Churchland, Paul (1981). "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes". Journal of Philosophy. 78 (2, February): 67–90.}, note = { Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=794498} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=794498} }