@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Churchland,Patricia}, subject = {Propositional Attitudes}, note = {Cresswell II 55 Causal role/Fodor/propositional attitudes/CresswellVsFodor: Fodor is interested in the causal role that belief and wishes play in behavior. This is understood in terms of manipulating formulas in a mental code. Patricia ChurchlandVsFodor: (1980) does not do justice to half-conscious and unconscious attitudes. --- II 56 Causal role/CresswellVsFodor: what would that kind of entities be that would have to occur in a causal explanation? Example: (3) Fodor believes that meanings are in the head. Mentalese/CresswellVsFodor: Supposed that meanings are internal representations. Problem: (3) can be said by different people on different occasions, but must then have the same meaning. If we do not accept this, there is no problem with propositional attitudes at all.}, note = { Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=792399} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=792399} }