@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Boer,Steven E.}, subject = {Representation}, note = {I 16 Representation/conceptual dependency/non-actualism/referential quantification/Boer: the referential quantification does not work so easy here. Representation/Solution/Boer: there is a completely intelligible property which can have a real relation: the representation: (CD) R is a concept-dependent relation = it is possible that for some objects x and y and properties F and G, x R to y, qua has the thing that is F, but x has R not to y qua the thing, which is G. (CD)) says that the speech of x relation to y qua F-thing ((s) x is the same F as y): namely, x's representation of y. Conceptual relation: could then be mediated by representations in the sense that to be in relation R to y, x be behavioristic to the intrinsic properties of a (verbal or non-verbal) representation which in its turn is associated with y in the correct manner Thought object: here it can be a kind of "presentation". (E.g. souvenir image, causally based on y, a private name or label).}, note = { Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=755284} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=755284} }