@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 19 Mar 2024}, author = {Bigelow,John}, subject = {Time}, note = {I 192 Branched Time/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: we allow the time to be branched, i. e. there are several futures for each past. We should also allow something like this to be possible for development within one. That is, two parts could have the same origin. Also fusion and temporary joining of parts. >Mereology, >Cause, >Origin. Problem: it is surprising that such parts would have to have at least one temporal part in common. For example, suppose we meet Jane from another part of the same possible world. Let's consider the Counterfactual conditional: if we had not met Jane, she would not have existed. >Counterfactual conditional. BigelowVsLewis: according to him it must be true Bigelow/Pargetter: according to us it is obviously wrong. There must therefore be at least one possible world in which Jane exists and we do not meet her. And this possible world must then contain all Janes and us, even though there is no connection between us. LewisVsVs: he would then have to accept any other connection and corresponding counterfactual conditional: "... an ancestor or descendant of ours could have met an ancestor or descendant of her" etc. BigelowVsLewis: this is still wrong in the world in question and less plausible than the above mentioned counterfactual conditional. This shows the falseness of temporal theory. >Possible worlds/Lewis, >Counterpart theory/Lewis. BigelowVsLewis: he is in a dilemma: either he takes the world companion relation as a primitive basic concept or he allows modal basic concepts. >Cross world identity. I 193 Counterpart relation/GR/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: Lewis still counts on a more important relation, the counterpart relation: it is not a good candidate either for an unanalysed basic concept, and yet it also needs modal basic terms. >Counterpart relation, >Basic concepts. BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsCounterpart Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: it also leads to circularity because it requires modal concepts. >Circular reasoning, >Modalities. This means that it cannot justify the modal logic. >Modal logic.}, note = { Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=747130} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=747130} }