@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Millikan,Ruth},
subject = {Natural Kinds},
note = {I 11
Properties/Kind/Millikan: propoerties exist only in the actual world (our real world).
MillikanVsNominalism.
>Nominalism.
I 328
Natural kinds/Putnam/Millikan: Thesis: at least in the case of natural kind-concepts, the intension does not determine the extension.
Reason: it is possible that such concepts have identical intensions but different extensions.
Meaning/Putnam: whatever has different extensions, must have different meanings. Therefore, meanings cannot be in the head.
>Meanings ain't in the head/Putnam.
I 329
Putnam/Millikan: his argumentation here is that of a realist.
>Realism, >Internal realism.
Meaning/Millikan: if meanings are not intensions, there must be something else that can determine the reference or the extension.
>Intension, >Extension, >Reference.
Natural kind/solution/Putnam: contrary to the appearance natural kind-concepts are indexical. And tradition has always had its difficulties with this.
Extension/Putnam: Thesis: the extension of "water" and "gold" is determined by a relation between the expression token and the extension.
MillikanVsPutnam: that is the reason why he mistakenly thinks that natural kind-concepts are indexical. No problem is solved, but only one is named.},
note = { Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451394}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451394}
}