@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Millikan,Ruth}, subject = {Natural Kinds}, note = {I 11 Properties/Kind/Millikan: propoerties exist only in the actual world (our real world). MillikanVsNominalism. >Nominalism. I 328 Natural kinds/Putnam/Millikan: Thesis: at least in the case of natural kind-concepts, the intension does not determine the extension. Reason: it is possible that such concepts have identical intensions but different extensions. Meaning/Putnam: whatever has different extensions, must have different meanings. Therefore, meanings cannot be in the head. >Meanings ain't in the head/Putnam. I 329 Putnam/Millikan: his argumentation here is that of a realist. >Realism, >Internal realism. Meaning/Millikan: if meanings are not intensions, there must be something else that can determine the reference or the extension. >Intension, >Extension, >Reference. Natural kind/solution/Putnam: contrary to the appearance natural kind-concepts are indexical. And tradition has always had its difficulties with this. Extension/Putnam: Thesis: the extension of "water" and "gold" is determined by a relation between the expression token and the extension. MillikanVsPutnam: that is the reason why he mistakenly thinks that natural kind-concepts are indexical. No problem is solved, but only one is named.}, note = { Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451394} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451394} }