@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Millikan,Ruth},
subject = {Naturalism},
note = {I 87
Naturalism/Millikan: Problem: naturalistic theories cannot be proved as true against Cartesian skepticism.
>Skepticism.
Correspondence/Millikan: no one doubts that sentences of world correspond, unless one gives up correspondence theory as a whole.
Image: it is less clear that correspondence has to do with mapping rules.
Problem: it is not clear how to describe the corresponding ontology.
>Correspondence/Millikan, >Correspondence theory.},
note = { Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451393}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451393}
}