@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Millikan,Ruth}, subject = {Epistemology}, note = {I 269 Epistemology/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle reappears at the level of epistemology: I 270 For example, the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the assertion "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions. Problem: then follows from "x is not red": "x does not look red for .. under ...". Ontology: this corresponds to the fact that non-red would be a void, an absence of red - rather than an opposite of red. However, it is about that "x is not red" is equivalent to "x does not look red under standard ..." is either empty or false. >Appearance, >Apearance/Leibniz, >Perception/Aristotle, >Knowledge, >Predication.}, note = { Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451100} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=451100} }