@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Hintikka,Jaakko}, subject = {Possible World Semantics}, note = {II 43 Semantics of Possible Worlds/possible world semantics/non-existent objects/non-existence/possibility/Hintikka: the semantics of possible worlds should assume possible individuals as inhabitants not only of possible worlds, but even of the actual world. II 50 Semantics of Possible Worlds/HintikkaVsFrege: here there is no >systematic ambiguity, i.e. the expressions mean intensionally the same as extensionally. >Intensions, >Extensions. E.g. to know what John knows is to know the worlds that are compatible with his belief, and to know which ones are not. II 51 Extra premise: for this, one must be sure that an expression in different worlds picks out the same individual. Context: what the relevant worlds are, depends on the context. E.g. Ramses: here the case is clear. On the other hand: E.g. Herzl knew that Loris was a great poet. Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal. II 53 Meaning Function/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: the difference of my approach to that of Frege is that I consider the problems locally, while Frege regards them globally. Fregean sense (= way of being given)/Hintikka: the Fregean sense must be regarded as defined for all possible worlds. >Fregean sense, >Way of givenness. On the other hand: Hintikka: if the Fregean sense is constructed as a meaning function, it must be regarded in my approach only as defined for the relevant alternatives. Frege: Frege uses the concept of the identity of the senses implicitly. And as a function of meaning the identity is only given if the mathematical function applies for all relevant arguments. Totality/Hintikka: this concept of the totality of all logically possible worlds is now highly doubtful. Solution/Hintikka: precisely the semantics of possible worlds helps to dispense with the totality of all possible worlds ((s) and to only consider the relevant alternatives, defined by the context). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: the Fregean sense was constructed as a quasi-object (object of setting, propositional object, thought object, object of belief), because they were assumed as entities in the actual world, however abstract they were. II 54 Meaning Function/HintikkaVsFrege/Hintikka: unlike Fregean senses, meaning functions are neither here nor elsewhere. Problem/Hintikka: Frege was tempted to reify his "senses". Object of Knowledge/object of thought/Frege/Hintikka: Frege has never considered the problem, unlike e.g. Quine. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. II 57 Meaning Function/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: in order to be a solution, the meaning function must be a constant function, that is, it must pick out the same individuals in all the worlds. II 205 Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: the semantics of possible worlds needs no conception of possible worlds as complete cosmological worlds, but only "small worlds", rather like event progress or situations, I also speak of "scenarios". >Situations. Possible World/Hintikka: the expression possible world is misleading, if one considers them as complete worlds.}, note = { Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=411541} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=411541} }