@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Hare,Richard Mervyn}, subject = {Statements}, note = {II 133 Statements/tradition/Hare: Hare divides statements into empirical and analytical ones. In addition to that there seems to be nothing else. >Analyticity. Problem: one can easily assume on the basis of a confusion that the proposition, which states that the other proposition is analytically true or false, is itself analytic. But it is at least not obviously true that e.g. the statement "propositions of the form 'p and not p' are analytically false" should be analytically true. Is it not a statement of how the words "and not" are used? And is it not analytically true that they are used in this way and not otherwise? Problem: there is a conflict here between the temptations to call the statement analytically, as well as empirically, as well as neither of both options. Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein calls the discussion "nonsensical." CarnapVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein's behavior is contradictory: instead of being silent, he writes a whole book. II 134 HareVsCarnap: Carnap does not take Wittgenstein's doubts seriously enough. >Wittgenstein, >Carnap.}, note = { Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=404157} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=404157} }