@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Cavell,Stanley}, subject = {Meaning (Intending)}, note = {I 14 To mean/meaning/Cavell: There is a difference between the meaning of the words we use and what we mean when we give them a voice. >Speaking, >Implicature. Thesis: Our ability to mean what we say is dependent on two characteristics of our situation: 1. from the everydayness, the ordinariness of the resources at our disposal. 2. from the fact that we are the ones that access these resources. >Convention, >Community, >Understanding. We sometimes achieve or sometimes we do not achieve to mean what we say with our words! --- II 168 Cavell thesis: what we usually say and mean can have a direct and profound control over what we can say and mean in the philosophical sense. II 205 To mean/must/Cavell: this is not about reproducing the meaning as what you "must mean". Intension is not a substitute for intention. >Intension, >Intention. Cavell Thesis: Still, if we say "we must something", we imply that we are convinced of it, although it is not analytically, it is necessarily true! >Analytical, >a priori, >necessarily. Truth/Necessity/Cavell: if truth (with Aristotle) means: From what it is to say that it is, Then necessary truth is From what is, to say what it is. ((s) How it is done). But it is a profound prejudice to mean that it was a matter of content. It does not apply to all statements, but to those who are concerned with actions, and therefore have a rule description complementarity. >Truth. II 207 Necessity/Language/Cavell: 1. it is perfectly correct that the German language could have developed differently. 2. There is no way out when you say "I can say what I want, I do not always have to use the normal forms". You do not want to argue that you can talk without the language providing the possibility for this? II 208 E.g. A baker could use "voluntarily" and "automatically" synonymously. If it then follows that the professor does not understand the baker, then the professor would not understand another professor any more! >Language use, >Speaking. II 208 Method/Mates: Grewendorf/Meggle S 160): two methods: 1. Extensional: one brings out the meaning of a word by finding out what it has in common with other cases of its use. >Extension. 2. Intensive method: one asks the person concerned what he means. >Intension. II 209 Language/Cavell: it is not the case that we always know only by empirical investigations what words mean. We could not then come to generalizations. For example, half of the population could use "voluntarily" and "automatically" without any difference, but it does not show that the two are synonymous, but that both apply to the action of the person in question! II 210 It may be that the baker even insists that the two words mean the same. One could then argue: "You can say it, but you cannot mean it!" "You cannot mean what you would mean if you had chosen the other wording." Why is the baker not entitled to his argument then? >Assertibility. II 211 To a philosopher we would say in this situation (> Humpty Dumpty): 1. That he limits his expressive possibilities. 2. That he has a shortened theory of what it means to do something. Likewise, the philosopher who asks in everything: "analytical or synthetic?" has a shortened concept of communication. >Communication. II 213 Language/Cavell: The error is based on the assumption that the normal use of a word represents a function of the internal state of the speaker. To mean/Cavell: the false assumption that a statement about what we mean is synthetic comes from the fact that we believe that it describes the mental processes of a speaker. In reality, it is about the use of language. >Mental states, >Mind. For example, to a child, we might say, "You do not know, you believe it". The child learns the word usage. II 215 To mean/Cavell: there is no such activity as finding out what I mean with a word. But there is a finding out what a word means. >Language acquisition.}, note = { Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.), Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=358730} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=358730} }