@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Benacerraf,Paul}, subject = {Beliefs}, note = {Field II 373 Belief/empiricism/rules/irrefutability/Benacerraf(1973)(1): if our system of rules were independent of any evidence for a particular physical theory, this would make our belief causally and counterfactually independent of the facts. This would, however, thwart the epistemic value of considerations based on this belief. >Evidence, >Rules, >Knowledge, >Certainty, >Theories, cf. >Empiricism, >Causal explanation, >Causality. Logic/Apriority/Field: it looks at first as if one could also use the argument for a priori belief in logic. >a priori, >Logic. FieldVs: but it is pointless to ask whether logical beliefs depend on logical facts. >Beliefs, >Facts, >Dependence. 1. Benacerraf, P. Mathematical Truth, The Journal of Philosophy 70, 1973, S. 661–679.}, note = { Bena I P. Benacerraf Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=338083} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=338083} }